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Proxy wars and controversies?
“The war on terrorism in Southeast Asia has prompted the U.S. to
reestablish its presence in the region, which it neglected after
withdrawing from the Philippines in 1991. The U.S. is now actively
involved in various anti terrorism activities with Southeast Asian
countries as part of its global campaign against terrorism.
Beyond anti-terrorism, the U.S. has deeper strategic intentions in
reestablishing its presence in the Southeast. These intentions are
to contain China, to protect U.S. strategic and economic interest
in Southeast Asia, and to control the sea lanes of communications
in the South China Sea.”
These are among the summaries and conclusions of Rommel. C.
Banlaoi, a professor of Political Science at the National Defense
College of the Philippines where he served as vice president for
Administrative Affairs from 1998-2002 and as assistant vice
president for Research and Special Studies in 1998., in his book
entitled “War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia.”
Consisting of 233 pages, the book has seven chapters, starting
with “introduction” in chapter one which deals on definitional
problem of terrorism, the meaning of terrosim in Southeast Asia,
conceptualizing terrorism after 9/11 and terrorism : in search of
a universal meaning. Chapter 2 is an overview of the war on
terrorism in Southeast Asia—specifically the Al Qaeda connections
in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
The responses of such countries to terrorism are treated in
chapter 3. America’s strategic intentions in the war on terrorism
in SEA is discussed with depth in chapter 4, with particular
emphasis on how to contain China, promote U.S. strategic interests
in the SEA region and controlling the sea Lanes of Communication.
The U.S. war on terrorism in SEA and its implications for major
power relations with Australia, China, India, Japan and Russia are
highlighted in chapter 5.
The more meaty discussion about Philippine-American Security
relations and the war on terrorism in SEA is found in chapter 6,
which discusses the Philippines in American Security in Asia, the
RP-US Since 9/11. It also asks-“quo vadis, RP-us Security
Relations?
But the more intriguing if not disturbing portion of the book is
found in chapter 7, where the author’s summaries and conclusions
are found. For example, the author asserts that “Because of the
global campaign against terrorism, Southeast Asia’s strategic
significance in regional and global politics has significantly
increased. Southeast Asia has become a very important element in
the global strategic landscape. The reestablished US presence in
the region, Chinese active engagement with Southeast Asian
countries, India’s look east policy, Australia’s concept of
strategic space in Southeast Asia, and Japan’s Southeast Asian
policy are strong indicators of Southeast Asian new found
relevance in the global strategic discourse.”
He noted that Philippine support to the U.S.-led global campaign
against terrorism has indeed reinvigorated RP-US relations, but
the RP has to realize that it also needs the cooperation of China
to bolster its own security. “China is an Asian power that the
Philippines cannot take for granted for economic and strategic
reasons”, he asserts.
As Professor Bataoli observed, the Philippines is suffering from a
“strategic dilemma of balancing its relations not only with the
U.S. and China but also with other countries in the international
society, which may be attributed to the strategic vacuum
prevailing among defense and foreign affairs officials” in the
country. However, he pointed out, America has a deeper strategic
intention in the war on terrorism and is part of the global
“realpolitik” that all nations have to accept. China and and other
powers like India and Japan also have their own intentions and
motivations in joining the war on terrorism, he opined.
Then, the author postulates—“whatever their intentions are, what
matter(s) is how nation states process those strategic intentions
to promote its own national interests because at the end of the
day, no one is the guardian of his own interest other than
himself.” In the real world of international relations, national
interests dictate the behavior of nation –states. The Philippines
is not an exemption to the cardinal rule of realpolitik, Bataoili
concludes.
Bataoili’s book went off the press before all the 2005 scandals
were out. Ideas about amending the 1987 Constitution, including
the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government
and the cancellation of the 2007 elections were not yet on center
stage of discussions. ISAFP’s alleged wire tapping activities did
not hit the headlines yet. Even the idea of shortening PGMA’s term
of office never surfaced out.
Left out in all these hullabaloos is the issue on national
economy, patrimony and security, which necessarily will be
included in whatever charter changes we may have.
Short of saying it, professor Bataoili is actually saying that
America, China and all other world powers, or even those who are
pretending to be so, are waging a proxy war, via the anti
terrorism campaign. Proxy wars usually take proxy battle fields.
Southeast Asia, which necessarily includes the Philippines, is in
danger of being so.
It is only hoped and prayed that our politicians are not engaging
also in proxy controversies to camouflage the true intentions of
compromising national sovereignty, particularly in the fields of
economy and security, via constitutional change.
