San Diego, CA. When Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili decided to invade South Ossetia while Vladimir Putin was enjoying the opening fireworks at the Beijing Olympics, he did not anticipate that he will be met with equally or more massive fireworks in the process. Putin left the Olympics and shortly thereafter tanks and warplanes were bombing Georgian forces for the world to see. Perhaps it is because of the Beijing events that Americans were glued to the medal tally counts that many missed the significance of what was taking place on the other side of the world.

        It is hard to imagine that while President George W. Bush was enjoying the bleacher view of the American NBA superstars drubbing of Yao Ming and company that he did not know what the Georgian president was about to do. I would even venture to say that Mikhail Saakashvili was probably duped into action by the decider in Washington D.C. perhaps convinced that with the exhibited closeness of the U.S. educated president with the White House that Russia would not dare engage the invading forces. Well, both were wrong.

        The war between Georgia and Russia appears to be drawing to a close as the Russians declared themselves ready to make peace with Georgia, and U.N. officials said the Georgians were ready to complete the withdrawal of their forces from South Ossetia. But the events of the last few days have taught the U.S. and its NATO Allies valuable albeit painful and embarrassing lessons - only bite what you can chew.

        Even with the declaration of President Bush that a humanitarian aid package for Georgia that could end up putting U.S. military forces uncomfortably close to Russian troops in South Ossetia will not change the fact that the U.S. overtures in the Caucasus have backfired. At this point, the Russians have achieved what they wanted to achieve, quite apart from assuring South Ossetia's autonomy. First, they have driven home the fact that in the end, they are the dominant power not only in the Caucasus but also around their entire periphery. Alliance with the United States or training with foreign advisers ultimately means little; it is not even clear what the United States or NATO would have been able to do if Georgia had been a member of the alliance. That lesson is not for the benefit of Georgia, but for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, and even Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russians have made it clear that, at least at this moment in history, they can operate on their periphery effectively and therefore their neighbors should not be indifferent to Russian wishes.

        The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. Despite the sharp rhetoric from President Bush, Vice President Dick Chaney, and European officials the fact remains that the U.S. has no strategic ground forces in reserve and in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery while the Europeans are too militarily weak to have any options.

        The second lesson was for the Americans and Europeans to consider. The Russians had asked that Kosovo not be granted independence. The Russians were prepared to accept autonomy but they did not want the map of Europe to be redrawn; they made it clear that once that starts, not only will it not end, but the Russians would feel free to redraw the map themselves. The Americans and Europeans went forward anyway, making the assumption that the Russians would have no choice but to live with that decision. The Russian response to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia drives home the point that the Russians are again a force to be reckoned with.

        The Americans in particular have another problem. Iran is infinitely more important to them than Georgia, and they need Russian help in Iran. Specifically, they need the Russians not to sell the Iranians weapons. In particular, they do not want the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles delivered to the Iranians. In addition, they want the Russians to join in possible sanctions against Iran. Russia has a number of ways to thwart U.S. policy not only in Iran, but also in Afghanistan and Syria. These are areas of fundamental concern to the United States, and confronting the Russians on Georgia is a risky business. The Russians can counter in ways that are extremely painful to the United States.

        There is talk that the Russians might want a new government in Georgia. That is probably so, but the Russians have already achieved their most important goals. They have made it clear to their neighbors that a relationship with the West does not provide security if Russia's interests are threatened. They have made it clear to the West that ignoring Russian wishes carries a price. And finally, they have made it clear to everyone that the Russian military, which was in catastrophic shape five years ago, is sufficiently healed to carry out a complex combined-arms operation including land, air and naval components. Granted it was against a small country, but there were many ways in which the operation could have been bungled. It wasn't. Russia is not a superpower, but it is certainly no longer a military cripple. Delivering that message, in the end, might have been the most important to Russia.