San Diego, CA. -- Benazir Bhutto, leader of Pakistan’s largest political party and the country’s former two-time prime minister, was assassinated last Thursday. The foremost question on everybody’s mind is who killed her and why? With such an important political target, many emerge as possible suspects. Although majority here in America believes that President Pervez Musharraf is the primary suspect, I don’t believe he did it. Certainly, the U.S. is another prime suspect but again, I disagree. Is it then the new general of the Pakistani Army? Well, quite possibly. How about al Qaeda? Yes, most definitely! Perhaps, none of these make any sense. However, please indulge me.

        Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) could have emerged as the largest party in parliament in the Jan. 8 elections. She was one of the three pillars of the government the United States was working to put together in its efforts to stabilize Islamabad.

        The U.S. efforts are geared toward getting Pakistan back on track in its role as a frontline state in the fight against jihadists. Washington was hoping Bhutto would work out a power-sharing agreement with President Pervez Musharraf and that they, along with new army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would form a civil-military regime made up of moderate forces that could effectively combat rising extremism and terrorism in the country. Though this was not an outright solution, it had the potential to be the starting point for other solutions. Not that this would have been an effective alignment of forces, but it was the best option given the circumstances.

        From the U.S. viewpoint, stability in Pakistan is important because the country plays a critical role in U.S.-NATO efforts to combat the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Furthermore, over the last five years Pakistan has emerged as the global headquarters of al Qaeda. The United States realized that Musharraf on his own is unable to deal with a growing crisis of governance in the country, much less with Islamist militancy. The solution was to bring Bhutto’s PPP into the system in order to stabilize it.

        Stated differently, if the U.S. wants to defeat al Qaeda, the endgame of the U.S.-jihadist war had to be played out in Pakistan. There are two reasons that could account for this. The first is simple: Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda command cell are located in Pakistan. The war cannot end while the command cell functions or has a chance of regenerating. The second reason is more complicated. The United States and NATO are engaged in a war in Afghanistan.

        Any hope of defeating the Taliban, or of reaching some sort of accommodation, depends on isolating them from Pakistan. So long as the Taliban have sanctuary and logistical support from Pakistan, transferring all coalition troops in Iraq to Afghanistan would have no effect. And withdrawing from Afghanistan would return the situation to the status quo before Sept. 11. If dealing with the Taliban and destroying al Qaeda are part of any endgame, the key lies in Pakistan.

        Despite the billions of dollars of aid money that the U.S. has poured to Pakistan, Pres. Musharaff, however, has shown that he was unwilling or incapable of writing finis to the al Qaeda chapter. Musharraf’s intentions were inherently unpredictable. As a creature of the Pakistani army, he reflects all of the ambivalences and tensions of that institution. His primary interest was in holding on to power. To do that, he needed to avoid American military action in Pakistan while simultaneously reassuring radical Islamists he was not a mere tool of the United States. Given the complexity of his position, no one could ever be certain of where Musharraf stood. His position was entirely tactical, shifting as political necessity required. He was constantly placating the various parties, but since the process of placation for the Americans meant that he take action against the jihadists, constant ineffective action by Musharraf resulted. He took enough action to keep the Americans at bay, not enough to force his Islamist enemies to take effective action against him.

        Thus, the U.S. began pressuring the general to give up his uniform if he wanted to continue his presidency but must rule as a civilian. Part of the pressure was allowing Bhutto to come home and allowed to share power with Musharraff after an election. When Bhutto’s welcome party was bombed, she turned south and was no longer interested in sharing power with the president and began her own campaign for the presidency.

        Musharaff saw an opening and declared a state of emergency. Musharaff was obviously confused by the mixed signals coming from the U.S. and Bhutto so he tested the waters. After numerous shuttle diplomacies involving top U.S. government officials, it appeared everything was back on line. John Negroponte, the American top spy was able to convince Bhutto to toe the line. Consequently, Musharaff gave up his uniform and eventually lifted the state of emergency.