The Clash of Civilizations Part II

San Diego, CA. The U.S. Global War on Terrorism is now over three years old. Like most wars, its course has been an unfolding surprise. It is a war of many parts — some familiar, some unprecedented. Like all wars, it has been filled with heroism, cowardice, lies, confusion and grief. As usual, it appears to everyone that the levels of each of these have been unprecedented. In truth, however, very little about this war is unprecedented — save that all wars are, by definition, unprecedented. Only one thing is certain about this war: Like all others, it will end. The issue on the table is: What is the current state of this war, and how will it end?

The Sept. 11 attacks were designed to demonstrate the vulnerability of the United States. They also were designed to entice the United States to wage multiple wars in the Islamic world while pursuing al Qaeda directly and indirectly, further opening the United States up to attack and attrition. Al Qaeda did demonstrate American vulnerability, and the United States did surge into the Muslim world. It did encounter resistance and took casualties.

But al Qaeda completely failed to achieve its strategic goals. There was no rising in the Islamic street. Not a single Muslim regime fell. Not a single regime moved closer to Al Qaeda’s position. Almost all Muslim regimes moved to closer cooperation with the United States. Viewed through the lens of Al Qaeda’s hopes and goals, therefore, the war so far has been a tremendous failure. In various tapes and releases, Al Qaeda officials — including Osama bin Laden — have expressed their frustration and their commitment to continue the struggle. However, it is essential to realize that from Al Qaeda’s strategic point of view, the last three years have been a series of failures and disappointments.

This is the objective reality. It is not, however, the American perception. The first reason for this perception gap is the definition the administration has given the war: It is a war on terrorism. If the goal of the war has been to deny al Qaeda strategic victory, then the United States is winning the war. If, on the other hand, the goal of the war is to protect the homeland against any further attacks by al Qaeda or other groups, then that goal has not been achieved. By U.S. waging the fight overseas does not necessarily mean that al Qaeda will no longer attack the homeland.

Al Qaeda’s primary operational capability is its ability to evade U.S. intelligence capabilities. This is not a trivial capability. Three years into the war, the precise shape and distribution of al Qaeda and related organizations are still not transparent to U.S. intelligence. However much more the United States knows about al Qaeda, it does not appear that its abilities are sufficient to guarantee the security of the United States or allied countries against enemy attacks. There are too many potential targets and several has been targeted - the bombing in Madrid and Bali, the downing of the Russian airliners, the sinking of a domestic ferry in the Philippines, to name a few and al Qaeda remains too invisible to guarantee that.

Therefore, on a purely operational level, the United States does not see itself as winning the war. Thus, there is an interesting paradox here. On the strategic side, al Qaeda is losing — and thus the United States is winning — the strategic war, and this, of course, is the decisive sphere. On the operational side, even though there has thus far been no repeat of the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States, the war is at a stalemate. Public perception is more sensitive to the operational stalemate than to the strategic success.
While al Qaeda seems to be in crisis over its failure to achieve its strategic goals, the United States is also facing its own strategic crisis. Since Vietnam, the fundamental question has been whether the United States has sufficient will and national unity to execute a long-term war. One of the purposes of the Iraq invasion was to demonstrate American will. The errors in what we might call information warfare — or propaganda — by the Bush administration have generated severe doubts. The administration’s management of the situation has turned into a strategic defeat — although not a decisive one as yet.

Massive dissent about wars has been the norm in American history. We tend to think of World War II as the norm, but, quite the contrary, it was the exception. The Revolutionary War, Mexican War, Civil War, Vietnam War and others all contained amazing levels of rancor among the American public. The vilification among the citizenry of Washington’s generalship or Lincoln’s presidency during the action was quite amazing. Thus, it is not the dissent that is startling, but the perception of U.S. weakness that it generates in the Islamic world. And the responsibility does not rest with the dissidents, but with the president’s failure to understand the strategic consequences of public incoherence on policy issues. The Bush administration’s plan in Iraq is too simplistic. Keeping it simple works only when the simple explanation is not too difficult to understand.

Presently, the war, on the whole, is being won by the United States or, more precisely, is being lost by al Qaeda. The purely military aspects of the war are going better for the United States than is the politico-military effort, primarily due to the complexity of coercing allies without causing them public humiliation. But that is also the weak point of the U.S. campaign and the point at which al Qaeda will try to counterattack. That covert coercion could, al Qaeda hopes, energize a political movement it is trying to create.

The war is far from over. The snapshot of the moment does not tell us what either side may do in the future. The United States is in the driver seat, so to speak, because it picks the place of its choosing where to wage war. The United States clearly intends to move into Pakistan to find bin Laden’s command center. But, it must also address the nuclear threats posed by the other members of the Axis of Evil: Iran and North Korea. But that is here and there. The United States is currently embroiled in insurgency campaign in Iraq and working double time to ensure the general elections on January 30, 2005 pushes through. But that is a big question mark.

The longer the United States is engaged in that campaign the less time it will have to prosecute the global war on terrorism. Making noises now about nuclear threat in Iraq and North Korea - although may be well-grounded- is like that boy who cried wolf too often. But it is giving the impression similar to the months prior to the Iraqi invasion that the U.S. is planning some form of military actions against these countries.

Al Qaeda clearly intends to destabilize Saudi Arabia and any other target of opportunity that might open up — Pakistan or Egypt. It is also aligning with other terrorist organizations or persons - the Chechen guerillas and Jordanian Abu Zarqawi are the latest - to expand its own war. The end is not in sight but in the end, as in all wars, there will be a negotiation.

It is impossible to really envision what that negotiation would look like or who the parties would actually be, but — returning to the point that this war, like all others, will end — complete victory by either side is the least likely scenario.
To be continued